Arguments that utilitarianism can justify the sacrifice of some minority for the sake of some majority, that it denies moral duty, etc. And an especially curious argument that it is contrary to certain theodicies; he whines that

The worse things that Util has done is blind us to an understanding of theodicy which would make God's allowence of evil accessable to the modern mind.

If we assume that pleasure over pain is the only moral good, and that outcome is all that matters, than of course we are going to complie the simplistic equastion, "evil happens, so there is no God." But that is an absurd equasion which overlooks our own complicity in evil doing.

But what does he think that Heaven and Hell are?

I recently read your page on atheistic morality, http://www.ebonmusings.org/atheism/carrot&stick.html While I may agree with your sentiment, there are a number of issues I felt you should address.

Actually, as you define ‘morality’ a’ ‘the way a person behaves in those situations that take the form of an N-person Prisoner's Dilemma’, it would seem that morality is simply a choice between short-termism and long-termism. In the long term, tit-for-tat with forgiveness is the best strategy, and is also what most people to perceive to be more moral than simple greedy short-termism. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tit_for_tat

You state that Objectivists would be incapable of getting out of the prisoners dilemma, because this would involve them not acting selfishly. I think you are misrepresenting their viewpoint by using the conventional definition of ‘selfish’ rather than an Objectivist one: certainly, I cannot think of any Objectivists who would advocate short-termism in a non zero-sum game of the sort you describe. Objectivists were always very in favour of mutually voluntary relationships. Indeed, with primary values of ‘"rationality", "productiveness," and "pride” (Wikipedia) it seems to be hard to derive that they could advocate such an unproductive and irrational course of action.

When discussing Virtue ethics, you say they have as an advantage ‘correct identification of happiness as the ultimate good’- but you never say why (or at least, not then.)

Afterwards, you say that they seem like intuitively good ideas, so it should be possibly to derive them. It seems like you have already decided what you are aiming for- surely this would somewhat impair your judgement? And is there any reason that our intuition should lead us to similar values as our reason? If you already have your conclusion, why bother with the method?

On Kant, you dismiss him by saying that the application of the categorical imperative would forbid any specialised job.

Firstly, you are mistaking the Categorical Imperative. That the result of a maxim’s universalisation would result in the collapse of society does not ban that maxim. Rather, it would only act as a weak duty not to act in such a way.

Correctly, the categorical imperative (in it’s first formulation, which is how you describe it) forbids us from any maxim that cannot be universalised without contradiction. We cannot universalise stealing, because at the same time it requires the institution of property to exist (so you can gain it) and destroys it (as everyone is stealing). It is impossible. There are also contradictions of the will, which are similar, but a lot more complex, and not relevant.

However, just because the state of affairs that would be brought about by the universalisation is undesirable does not mean we have a true duty to avoid it- Kant ignored all consequences.

The other, possibly more serious problem is that when someone decides to become a doctor, Kant would simply say that they were acting on the maxim that people should perfect their talents- something he espoused. ‘To become a doctor’ is not a maxim, and in no other area of moral philosophy do you treat propositions of this kind as a potential moral rule. You end moral system includes universalisation, but you do not include the universalaisation of employment choices: the universalisation of any employment would lead to unhappiness, which would be banned by the second part of your formal.

With the beggar, Kant does have an answer, although I disagree with him. Due to contradictions of the will, he thought that we should help others. we could end up in a situation where you want something, but need others to help you. If you want something, he argued you also will the means to it. If the means has to be via others help (like if you are disabled), you have to will that others help you; but you have already willed that people do not help each other! This is a contradiction of the will, so the maxim that we should not help others must be discarded.

With the third problem, the fact that Kant thinks that the Categorical imperative bans lying, in my opinion, simply means that he incorrectly applies the method. Lying can be universalised without the destruction of language.

Even were this not true, you could simply refrain from telling the Gestapo anything.

Finally, at this stage, you have no come up with any moral reasoning, method, system with which to say that turning people into the Gestapo is wrong. You are presuming your conclusion. It is not manifestly in error, and saying that it is unsing your conclusions is false.

It is strange that you even mention Rawls- what you describe is political philosophy, not moral philosophy!

When presenting your own moral system, you say the goal of morality is to promote happiness. If this is the goal of happiness, of course we will end up with utilitarianism! This is little more than a tautology, and a very different definition of morality than that possessed by most people.

Additionally, you say morality is how we behave in an N-person prisoner’s dilemma. However, the ends of this are correctly measured in utility, not happiness. I may chose a course of action that will make me unhappy, in an N-space prisoner’s dilemma or elsewhere, by acting on some principle, or for some other end. Becoming addicted to Soma would make me happy, but if we measure by utility I should avoid it. Peter Singer’s Preference Utilitarianism is more in keeping with both sense and your definition of morality.

You say that your formula should be applied in the same order it is read – suffering should be minimised first. Is this always true? Is minimising a minute amount of suffering more important than causing massive amounts of happiness? It seems that any sensible system must have some sort of exchange rate: otherwise the best thing to do would be to immediately nuke all major population centres- their suffering would be brief, and after that minimised.

You say that your principle is in accordance with justice, and that their ends will always co-inside. What if there is one very unpopular individual, whom is generally but incorrectly thought to be a mass murderer and rapist. Society would be much happier with his death. Furthermore, if we universalised this rule, that those who are generally thought to deserve death should be killed, we would still lead to a net increase in happiness.

Your principle requires us to ‘weigh the competing factors and relevant principles, determine what course of action is likely to produce the least suffering and the greatest happiness both now and in the long run’, and yet denies that there is any algorithm to do this. If there is a method, why do you not attempt to achieve it? If not, it would seem that you cannot complain if people reach radically different conclusions.

If we are to maximise happiness by thinking of how a reasonable person would react, how are we to judge who is reasonable? Would this not result in the tyranny of the majority: or even of the minority? I may think that any reasonable person would have similar music tastes to me: does this mean I should subject everyone else to my music, on the basis that anyone who disagrees is unreasonable?

It seems you are only able to reach your conclusion by misrepresenting opposing points of view and rejected them based on unproven premises, and then presuming your conclusion.

I would prefer a world of non-coercion to a world of utilitarianism. I place the happiness and freedom of the individual at the top of the moral pedestal. We can compete. But unlike in wild nature, in society we stop ourselves before our actions involve coercion of someone else. I think this is the right balance.

In my moral universe, everyone who is asked by society to do something for others should be compensated. Likewise, no one should demand from society and give nothing in return.

No one should be forced to conform or consider others' happiness at the expense of their own. I'm for limited help to those in need. But it does not follow that anyone's problem is everyone's problem. Unless you are talking about commonly shared resources, which if not managed properly, will fall prey to the tragedy of the commons. (such as the atmosphere or environment in general)

I know this is an old thread, but I think utilitarianism is often used to justify the "tyranny of the majority," high taxation, and all sorts of other coercive practices. It is therefore not a viable or forward-looking moral system.

"That would be a concern for a moral system that valued happiness equally whether it was based on false beliefs or not, but universal utilitarianism is not such a system. As I pointed out to Alonzo in the other thread, it is an important tenet of UU (though I didn't go into it in depth here) that happiness based on a falsehood should not be factored into the moral equation when we are seeking to make a decision. In any case, I would argue that atheism has the potential to produce at least as much happiness as religion without the negative moral aspects that usually accompany belief."

But humans are socially conditioned creatures: if society taught them lies and those lies make them happy, they will embrace them in spite of all reason. People who cling to false delusions can only be happy if they believe their delusions to be true.

I've learnded that it's better to allow certain people to embrace their delusions (without them, they're helpless). While they embrace these delusions, I can move unresticted by them and, sometimes, use those delusions to my advantage. If one can't stamp out delusion, one might as well use it...

I also worry that any account of utilitarianism, if it does not adequately establish and take into account the social nature of the lives we live, will inadvertedly give strength to any pragmatic justification for delusion, especially by way of religion. If religion makes the world, a community, a family or even an individual happier, and it is not clear that it doesn't, then it would seem that it should be believed in.

That would be a concern for a moral system that valued happiness equally whether it was based on false beliefs or not, but universal utilitarianism is not such a system. As I pointed out to Alonzo in the other thread, it is an important tenet of UU (though I didn't go into it in depth here) that happiness based on a falsehood should not be factored into the moral equation when we are seeking to make a decision. In any case, I would argue that atheism has the potential to produce at least as much happiness as religion without the negative moral aspects that usually accompany belief.

2) Thus, we seem to be left with a purely deterent system of justice in which it is tolerable and even moral obligatory to punish innocent people from time to time. Of course one can appeal to rule utilitarianism, but that is not what you do in the post. You speak of how each ACT should be justified.

3) I also worry that any account of utilitarianism, if it does not adequately establish and take into account the social nature of the lives we live, will inadvertedly give strength to any pragmatic justification for delusion, especially by way of religion. If religion makes the world, a community, a family or even an individual happier, and it is not clear that it doesn't, then it would seem that it should be believed in.

4) It remains unclear that happiness can be quantified in any meanigful manner. Can happiness and unhappiness really be judged on the same scale? Are they really opposites? Is suffering really just a form of unhappiness? By what standards are different qualities of happiness to be judged without begging the question? Are happiness and unhappiness really isolable experiences or do the activities upon which they supervene matter at all?

Based on your attacks against a bizarre, extremist caricature of "utilitarianism", I have to wonder whether you've even read the article, or whether you simply seized the word "utilitarianism" out of the title and responded to that in a reflexive fashion.

Aristotle's ethics theory and Kant's categorical imperative, and their failings, are both addressed in Adam's essay, the Ineffable Carrot and the Infinite Stick, on Ebonmusings, which may or may not be accessible at the moment.

Of course, liberalism is also a moral as well as political theory, one that is neutral toward personal ethics in society, but one that embraces tolerance for diversity and the pursuit of individual "modes of life" each in its own way. Utilitarianism has shown itself to be antiliberal, hostile to all liberal principles which liberals assumed were both foundational and functional. Indeed, it's was the incompatibility of utilitarianism with liberal theory that caused John Rawls to return to Kant in his "Theory of Justice." Rawls' own preposterous consequences suggest that "calculus" and "hyper-rationality" are too strong, or too intolerant, for human diversity.

But, while Kant's categorical imperative may create duties, its "moral sense" is too strong for all humans. We have "investments," "preferences," "family" that his over-rational theory proscribes. Alas, Aristotle had it basically right, but his concepts need ammendation from Kant and the emotivists, to balance a true moral sense in all of us.

The utilitarian calculus is inhumane and barbaric. That anyone would espouse it in this age is incomprehensible. At its core, it rejects human diversity and human pluralism. If a "one size fits all approach" suits your temperament, then buy into utilitarianism. Just be sure you are not on the "outside" of the construct.

Hitler was elected and reelected. Apparently, a majority thought him fulfilling their greatest good for the greatest number.

Given an accusation as serious as yours, I would hope you have a bit more to back it up than "apparently". It does not follow from the fact that Hitler was elected that either he or his followers held, believed in or practiced a utilitarian moral system. On the contrary, the fact that Germany invaded and attempted to dominate its far more populous neighbors strongly suggests that they did not hold such a view, but rather some sort of quasi-religious belief system (don't forget "Gott Mitt Uns") which held that God had guaranteed them victory on account of their racial purity, and that all other races, though more numerous than Aryans, were nevertheless to be subordinated to them.

More importantly, any claims that Hitler's actions would have increased the total happiness of humanity are simply wrong. Any student of history can see that for themselves: his government produced one of the human race's most devastating wars, an incalculable amount of death and suffering on every side, and the genocide of innocent millions. You seem to be under the misapprehension that if any action can possibly be defended using a utilitarian argument, that is the fault of utilitarianism, but that argument is hopelessly naive. Any action whatsoever can be defended using any moral system, so long as that system is sufficiently contorted. The issue is not what evil and deluded men will claim to justify their actions (and, again, let me note that you have presented no evidence at all that Hitler or any of the other infamous dictators you alluded to were professed utilitarians), but whether such moral systems naturally lead to such an inference.

According to Marxist theory, it is often necessary to use any means necessary to bring about the Utopian state. In Stalin's view, his economy could not sustain all the masses, and his enemies were also the state's enemies, so the slaughter, attrition, and deprivation of over 20 million (still a minority) helped the remaining majority achieve a higher good much faster, and removed any impediment to Stalin in achieving the greatest good for the greatest number.

Again, this argument is ludicrous on its face. You cannot calculate what will produce the greatest happiness for everyone by killing millions of people and thereby removing them from the equation! The wishes, desires and happiness of those people indisputably count as well. And, let me stress, it does not follow from universal utilitarianism that an action is right just because a majority desires to undertake it. The course of action UU endorses is the one that truly will produce the greatest happiness for every affected party in the long run, and even if a majority at any given time votes for a particular course, that does not make it the right one. In fact, the abuses you name strongly indicate that some sort of check is needed against raw majoritarian power to protect the happiness of minorities that would otherwise potentially be oppressed by them (and every group is a minority sooner or later). As I argued strongly in this post, UU absolutely does endorse the recognition and protection of basic human rights that should be held eternally inviolable. Perhaps other forms of utilitarianism are vulnerable to your argument, but UU is not.

Thus, the maxim is "the greatest good for the greatest number," and not "total happiness of humanity!" Where did you pick up this proposterous gem about "total happiness of humanity?"

Excuse me, but I did not "pick it up" anywhere. I thought of it myself. I am not slavishly following the philosophers of old; UU is not the same as previously proposed utilitarian moral theories.

So, what do you propose as an alternative?