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	<title>Comments on: The Doctrine of Double Effect</title>
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	<description>NIGHTTIME IS FOR DREAMING. DAYLIGHT IS FOR ACTION.</description>
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		<title>By: Dark Jaguar</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-44794</link>
		<dc:creator>Dark Jaguar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2009 18:34:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-44794</guid>
		<description>I think there&#039;s a 3rd option but it all depends on how far away these people are.  That&#039;s usually my answer to these sorts of moral dillemas, break the question itself.

Simply put, has anyone considered just shouting out to the people on the tracks to move out of the way?  Or, maybe you can&#039;t stop the train by throwing yourself in front of it, but are you massive enough to shove a victim off the track yourself?  Even lacking knowledge on if these would work, wouldn&#039;t they be the preferred moral solution?  Also, given the idea that perhaps they could move or be moved out of the way, I&#039;d likely redirect the tracks, but not shove the fat man, as in the first case I&#039;m only doing so as a backup measure and to make the job of saving the one in the path of the train easier and more likely.

I suppose it&#039;s worth noting that a fat man would have to be truly reprehensibly obese to stand any chance of stopping a runaway train?  I know that&#039;s not the point of the question but it&#039;s the first thing I think about when it&#039;s presented to me.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think there's a 3rd option but it all depends on how far away these people are.  That's usually my answer to these sorts of moral dillemas, break the question itself.</p>
<p>Simply put, has anyone considered just shouting out to the people on the tracks to move out of the way?  Or, maybe you can't stop the train by throwing yourself in front of it, but are you massive enough to shove a victim off the track yourself?  Even lacking knowledge on if these would work, wouldn't they be the preferred moral solution?  Also, given the idea that perhaps they could move or be moved out of the way, I'd likely redirect the tracks, but not shove the fat man, as in the first case I'm only doing so as a backup measure and to make the job of saving the one in the path of the train easier and more likely.</p>
<p>I suppose it's worth noting that a fat man would have to be truly reprehensibly obese to stand any chance of stopping a runaway train?  I know that's not the point of the question but it's the first thing I think about when it's presented to me.</p>
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		<title>By: Tony</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-44729</link>
		<dc:creator>Tony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 22:49:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-44729</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ve also come in late from the Happiness Machine post. The doctrine of double effect seems plausible as an explanation, but it occurs to me that the wording of these dilemmas, as they are presented here, leaves open at least 2 alternative explanations that should be considered.
1) If you push the fat man he will immediately react with horror, so that, in addition to causing his death, you are also causing him a few moments of additional suffering with which we can all easily empathize. That is something that most of us will intuitively grasp as soon as we start to imagine the scenario, such that it doesn&#039;t need to be explicitly spelled out in the description of the dilemma. However, the wording of the first dilemma allows us to assume that the single person on the other track may be completely oblivious to what is about to happen. This creates the possibility that in some peoples minds the outcomes of the two situations are not identical after all.
2) In the second situation, although the possibility of throwing yourself in front of the train is explicitly ruled out as ineffective, in our mental model of the situation it still exists as a possible course of action. I suspect that in many peoples minds this would, on some primal level, be seen as the most heroic, courageous, and therefore correct thing to do, even though it would not help in any way. But, we are not permitted to give that as our answer. This may create a situation in which pushing the fat man represents an act of cowardice, because we are forcing him to do something that we feel that we really should be doing ourselves.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I've also come in late from the Happiness Machine post. The doctrine of double effect seems plausible as an explanation, but it occurs to me that the wording of these dilemmas, as they are presented here, leaves open at least 2 alternative explanations that should be considered.<br />
1) If you push the fat man he will immediately react with horror, so that, in addition to causing his death, you are also causing him a few moments of additional suffering with which we can all easily empathize. That is something that most of us will intuitively grasp as soon as we start to imagine the scenario, such that it doesn't need to be explicitly spelled out in the description of the dilemma. However, the wording of the first dilemma allows us to assume that the single person on the other track may be completely oblivious to what is about to happen. This creates the possibility that in some peoples minds the outcomes of the two situations are not identical after all.<br />
2) In the second situation, although the possibility of throwing yourself in front of the train is explicitly ruled out as ineffective, in our mental model of the situation it still exists as a possible course of action. I suspect that in many peoples minds this would, on some primal level, be seen as the most heroic, courageous, and therefore correct thing to do, even though it would not help in any way. But, we are not permitted to give that as our answer. This may create a situation in which pushing the fat man represents an act of cowardice, because we are forcing him to do something that we feel that we really should be doing ourselves.</p>
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		<title>By: penn</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-44696</link>
		<dc:creator>penn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2009 13:06:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-44696</guid>
		<description>I came back in time to this post from your Happiness Machine post, and I hope others follow. I think you are wrong about pushing the man onto the tracks. Your intent is not to kill him. Your intent is to stop the train. It&#039;s the same as in the self-defense scenario. In order to defend yourself you must kill your attacker. In the trolley scenario, in order to save 5 lives you have to kill the fat man.

I think the two scenarios are the same morally, and the only difference is our visceral reaction. The idea of actually pushing a person to their death is chill inducing. The idea of actually using someone&#039;s corpse to stop a train is also unseemly. The idea of pulling a lever and getting someone hit by train is much tidier emotionally.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I came back in time to this post from your Happiness Machine post, and I hope others follow. I think you are wrong about pushing the man onto the tracks. Your intent is not to kill him. Your intent is to stop the train. It's the same as in the self-defense scenario. In order to defend yourself you must kill your attacker. In the trolley scenario, in order to save 5 lives you have to kill the fat man.</p>
<p>I think the two scenarios are the same morally, and the only difference is our visceral reaction. The idea of actually pushing a person to their death is chill inducing. The idea of actually using someone's corpse to stop a train is also unseemly. The idea of pulling a lever and getting someone hit by train is much tidier emotionally.</p>
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		<title>By: rob</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24787</link>
		<dc:creator>rob</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jun 2007 16:42:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24787</guid>
		<description>What if you have the choice of pushing the fat man or throwing the switch?  Even more vaguely, what if you have the option of saving five people, and saving either one of two individuals?  In either case, does it matter who the individuals are?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What if you have the choice of pushing the fat man or throwing the switch?  Even more vaguely, what if you have the option of saving five people, and saving either one of two individuals?  In either case, does it matter who the individuals are?</p>
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		<title>By: SM</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24765</link>
		<dc:creator>SM</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jun 2007 01:19:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24765</guid>
		<description>I don’t think your example of military ethics is as clear-cut as you suggest.  What if the terror will do more to end the war than the attack on ‘military’ targets?  Arthur Harris could sleep at nights because he firmly believed that a bomber did more to end World War II by attacking the easy target of civilian homes rather than the hard target of roads and factories.  Is dropping a bomb on a power plant, expecting to kill about 100 people directly or indirectly, less wrong than throwing a grenade into a crowd, expecting to kill about 10 people, if both are meant to win an equally just war as efficiently as possible?  Intent clearly matters somewhat, but so does effect.  You cannot renounce responsibility for a known evil consequence of an action by calling it a side effect of some other good consequence which makes up for it, IMHO.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don’t think your example of military ethics is as clear-cut as you suggest.  What if the terror will do more to end the war than the attack on ‘military’ targets?  Arthur Harris could sleep at nights because he firmly believed that a bomber did more to end World War II by attacking the easy target of civilian homes rather than the hard target of roads and factories.  Is dropping a bomb on a power plant, expecting to kill about 100 people directly or indirectly, less wrong than throwing a grenade into a crowd, expecting to kill about 10 people, if both are meant to win an equally just war as efficiently as possible?  Intent clearly matters somewhat, but so does effect.  You cannot renounce responsibility for a known evil consequence of an action by calling it a side effect of some other good consequence which makes up for it, IMHO.</p>
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		<title>By: John Gathercole</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24725</link>
		<dc:creator>John Gathercole</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2007 21:41:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24725</guid>
		<description>One thing you missed, Ebonmuse, is that the difference between the lever and the fat man is quantitative, not qualitative.  More people think pushing the fat man is wrong, but some people think it&#039;s right.  Likewise, some people think pulling the lever is wrong, because you are killing a person who would not have been killed if you had not intervened, and you don&#039;t have the right to play God with that person&#039;s life.

Likewise, imagine a third scenario, where you are required to strangle or eviscerate a fat man to stop the trolley.  More people would probably say this is wrong than simply pushing the fat man, but under the doctrine of double effect they should be the same.  I agree with the explanation you originally proposed; it&#039;s about the aversion to direct killing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One thing you missed, Ebonmuse, is that the difference between the lever and the fat man is quantitative, not qualitative.  More people think pushing the fat man is wrong, but some people think it's right.  Likewise, some people think pulling the lever is wrong, because you are killing a person who would not have been killed if you had not intervened, and you don't have the right to play God with that person's life.</p>
<p>Likewise, imagine a third scenario, where you are required to strangle or eviscerate a fat man to stop the trolley.  More people would probably say this is wrong than simply pushing the fat man, but under the doctrine of double effect they should be the same.  I agree with the explanation you originally proposed; it's about the aversion to direct killing.</p>
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		<title>By: Siamang</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24721</link>
		<dc:creator>Siamang</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2007 18:35:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24721</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;Whether double-effect reasoning came about through evolution or not is entirely a different question from whether it&#039;s a good idea, and the answer you give to one of those questions has no necessary bearing on the answer of the other.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Correct, Ebon.  Sloppy construction on my part there.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>Whether double-effect reasoning came about through evolution or not is entirely a different question from whether it's a good idea, and the answer you give to one of those questions has no necessary bearing on the answer of the other.</p></blockquote>
<p>Correct, Ebon.  Sloppy construction on my part there.</p>
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		<title>By: Mac</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24716</link>
		<dc:creator>Mac</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2007 13:32:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24716</guid>
		<description>After some more thought on this, I think I can add a bit more to my arguement on direct/indirect action.

First off though, I don&#039;t believe the death of the individual could be called &quot;unintended&quot;, since they are known about in each case.  Unintended I would take to more apply to an increase risk of killing an innocent bystander or accidental death.  The individual is clearly part of the moral question here, so if they are unintended in one case, they should be in both.

My thought would be (and this is heavily taking into account some of the comments above), that morally we accept the idea that sacrificing the individual is the more &quot;right&quot; course of action.  However when required to take direct action against someone, some of our evolved morality kicks in, basically the &quot;do unto others&quot; that I am going to propose manifests itself as horror or shock at such a thought.

This would serve the same function as the double effect that Ebon proposes, in that it aims to prevent moral outcomes that inevitably produce more overall suffering (which it has in the past, but may not in the future).  This is the same reaction that convinces us stealing/murder, etc is wrong at an intuitive level because the same could be done back to us.

The scenario where we throw a switch to condemn one person to death does not trigger this part of the brain since it doesn&#039;t recognise the concept of switches or interpret secondary effects of actions even if there is intent.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After some more thought on this, I think I can add a bit more to my arguement on direct/indirect action.</p>
<p>First off though, I don't believe the death of the individual could be called "unintended", since they are known about in each case.  Unintended I would take to more apply to an increase risk of killing an innocent bystander or accidental death.  The individual is clearly part of the moral question here, so if they are unintended in one case, they should be in both.</p>
<p>My thought would be (and this is heavily taking into account some of the comments above), that morally we accept the idea that sacrificing the individual is the more "right" course of action.  However when required to take direct action against someone, some of our evolved morality kicks in, basically the "do unto others" that I am going to propose manifests itself as horror or shock at such a thought.</p>
<p>This would serve the same function as the double effect that Ebon proposes, in that it aims to prevent moral outcomes that inevitably produce more overall suffering (which it has in the past, but may not in the future).  This is the same reaction that convinces us stealing/murder, etc is wrong at an intuitive level because the same could be done back to us.</p>
<p>The scenario where we throw a switch to condemn one person to death does not trigger this part of the brain since it doesn't recognise the concept of switches or interpret secondary effects of actions even if there is intent.</p>
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		<title>By: Mrnaglfar</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24714</link>
		<dc:creator>Mrnaglfar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2007 01:59:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24714</guid>
		<description>And to follow up, consider some more questions:

In regards to my second point, what if the train is coming towards your mother and by flipping the switch you would kill the other 5, rather then the other way around where not actting would save your mother&#039;s life.

What if 5 of your closest friends or family members were on that track, and the single person has the cure for AIDS. 

What if pushing that stranger infront of the train could save 10 lives instead of 5, or 20 lives, or 100. At what point is it still wrong?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>And to follow up, consider some more questions:</p>
<p>In regards to my second point, what if the train is coming towards your mother and by flipping the switch you would kill the other 5, rather then the other way around where not actting would save your mother's life.</p>
<p>What if 5 of your closest friends or family members were on that track, and the single person has the cure for AIDS. </p>
<p>What if pushing that stranger infront of the train could save 10 lives instead of 5, or 20 lives, or 100. At what point is it still wrong?</p>
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		<title>By: Mrnaglfar</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24711</link>
		<dc:creator>Mrnaglfar</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2007 01:33:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24711</guid>
		<description>When it comes to that scenerio it&#039;s alot more complicated then that. A few quick points:

1) Most people would agree pushing the large man in front of the train is wrong. A possible explaination for this is that it involves placing someone in the situation who wasn&#039;t there to begin with. In the first case, by pulling the lever, someone who was already on the tracks dies; In the second case, you place someone in front of the tracks. This is one of the reasons for the emotional response. 

2) Modify the question now, to get a different response: 5 strangers on one track and your mother on the other track. How many would now throw the switch and kill their mother in order to save 5 strangers (providing of course you like your mother. If not, replace her with someone you care for the most)? 

3) On the second point, we can see how people&#039;s morals can be manipulated. In that case it was by personalizing the question, but really, what it comes down to is how the dilemma is worded. Studies tend to show people are more apt to take risks depending on the wording. Paraphrased roughly from the book &quot;The Paradox of Choice&quot;, the study put people into two groups. In both scenerios, they are doctors in a village in which the people are dying, for the sake of argument, the population is 100. In one the problem roughly reads &quot;if you do X, you will save 60 people, if you do Y you have a 33% chance to save everyone, and a 67% chance to save no one&quot;. In this situation, most people will pick the first choice. In the second case, the question reads &quot;if you do X, 40 people will die. If you do Y you have a 33% no one will die, and 67% chance to not save anyone&quot;. In this case, most people now choose the second option. Again, same question, same results, but a change of wording will make people make a different choice. And this choice doesn&#039;t even involve dragging anyone else into the situation who wasn&#039;t already involved. 

In short, by chancing the wording from &quot;save&quot; to &quot;die&quot;, it will shift the line of thinking inbetween a gain and a loss.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When it comes to that scenerio it's alot more complicated then that. A few quick points:</p>
<p>1) Most people would agree pushing the large man in front of the train is wrong. A possible explaination for this is that it involves placing someone in the situation who wasn't there to begin with. In the first case, by pulling the lever, someone who was already on the tracks dies; In the second case, you place someone in front of the tracks. This is one of the reasons for the emotional response. </p>
<p>2) Modify the question now, to get a different response: 5 strangers on one track and your mother on the other track. How many would now throw the switch and kill their mother in order to save 5 strangers (providing of course you like your mother. If not, replace her with someone you care for the most)? </p>
<p>3) On the second point, we can see how people's morals can be manipulated. In that case it was by personalizing the question, but really, what it comes down to is how the dilemma is worded. Studies tend to show people are more apt to take risks depending on the wording. Paraphrased roughly from the book "The Paradox of Choice", the study put people into two groups. In both scenerios, they are doctors in a village in which the people are dying, for the sake of argument, the population is 100. In one the problem roughly reads "if you do X, you will save 60 people, if you do Y you have a 33% chance to save everyone, and a 67% chance to save no one". In this situation, most people will pick the first choice. In the second case, the question reads "if you do X, 40 people will die. If you do Y you have a 33% no one will die, and 67% chance to not save anyone". In this case, most people now choose the second option. Again, same question, same results, but a change of wording will make people make a different choice. And this choice doesn't even involve dragging anyone else into the situation who wasn't already involved. </p>
<p>In short, by chancing the wording from "save" to "die", it will shift the line of thinking inbetween a gain and a loss.</p>
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		<title>By: OhioAtheist</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24709</link>
		<dc:creator>OhioAtheist</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 2007 00:47:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24709</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;The whole underlying point of universal utilitarianism is precisely that a given course of action (i.e., not killing someone as a means to an end), produces better results in the long run if it is consistently followed, even though we might think an immediate gain could be realized by breaking it on certain specific occasions.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Here is where we disagree. You&#039;re making an unwarranted jump from &quot;This rule will work very well in most situations&quot; to &quot;We should &lt;i&gt;always&lt;/i&gt; follow this rule.&quot; However, if the purpose of the rule is to arrange for the best consequences (most happiness/least suffering), then it makes perfect sense to abandon it when it doesn&#039;t live up to that purpose. In fact, the &lt;i&gt;ultimate rule&lt;/i&gt; that we should consistently seek to follow--and the rule that should underlie all other rules--is to do that which will have the best consequences.

Now as I said, secondary rules are necessary, because without them moral reasoning would be very messy and inefficient. But this does not mean that we can&#039;t adjust the rules when specific situations warrant it. For instance, &quot;Don&#039;t kill people as means to ends&quot; is a good rule on the intuitive, everyday level of moral reasoning, but in the case of the trolley it leads inexorably to worse consequences. On a higher level, therefore, it is entirely possible to qualify the original rule, allowing for some exceptions. And the delineations can continue all the way up the ladder of moral specificity until we reach a moral code that allows for the best consequences in all circumstances.

Due to our limitations, we can&#039;t climb all the way up that ladder, but that&#039;s no reason to cling with all our might to the bottom rungs. When we find that a moral rule--even such an important one as &quot;Don&#039;t kill&quot;--will not lead to the best consequences in a given situation, we have all the warrant we need to say &quot;That rule works most of the time, but &lt;i&gt;not this time&lt;/i&gt;, and therefore we will allow a different rule for this set of circumstances.&quot; It&#039;s very much like how classical physics, which works so well in the macroscopic everyday world, becomes obsolete as we peer into the atomic and subatomic world. As physics requires new rules as we &quot;zoom in,&quot; so does morality need more sophisticated precepts to fit circumstances that can and do differ.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>The whole underlying point of universal utilitarianism is precisely that a given course of action (i.e., not killing someone as a means to an end), produces better results in the long run if it is consistently followed, even though we might think an immediate gain could be realized by breaking it on certain specific occasions.</p></blockquote>
<p>Here is where we disagree. You're making an unwarranted jump from "This rule will work very well in most situations" to "We should <i>always</i> follow this rule." However, if the purpose of the rule is to arrange for the best consequences (most happiness/least suffering), then it makes perfect sense to abandon it when it doesn't live up to that purpose. In fact, the <i>ultimate rule</i> that we should consistently seek to follow--and the rule that should underlie all other rules--is to do that which will have the best consequences.</p>
<p>Now as I said, secondary rules are necessary, because without them moral reasoning would be very messy and inefficient. But this does not mean that we can't adjust the rules when specific situations warrant it. For instance, "Don't kill people as means to ends" is a good rule on the intuitive, everyday level of moral reasoning, but in the case of the trolley it leads inexorably to worse consequences. On a higher level, therefore, it is entirely possible to qualify the original rule, allowing for some exceptions. And the delineations can continue all the way up the ladder of moral specificity until we reach a moral code that allows for the best consequences in all circumstances.</p>
<p>Due to our limitations, we can't climb all the way up that ladder, but that's no reason to cling with all our might to the bottom rungs. When we find that a moral rule--even such an important one as "Don't kill"--will not lead to the best consequences in a given situation, we have all the warrant we need to say "That rule works most of the time, but <i>not this time</i>, and therefore we will allow a different rule for this set of circumstances." It's very much like how classical physics, which works so well in the macroscopic everyday world, becomes obsolete as we peer into the atomic and subatomic world. As physics requires new rules as we "zoom in," so does morality need more sophisticated precepts to fit circumstances that can and do differ.</p>
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		<title>By: bassmanpete</title>
		<link>http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24707</link>
		<dc:creator>bassmanpete</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jun 2007 23:30:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.daylightatheism.org/2007/06/double-effect.html#comment-24707</guid>
		<description>Don&#039;t do anything - it&#039;s their own stupid fault for standing on the line anyway! Let the truck do its worst and propose the 5 for the Darwin Award :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Don't do anything - it's their own stupid fault for standing on the line anyway! Let the truck do its worst and propose the 5 for the Darwin Award :)</p>
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