You know, this is just comedic. After calling me willfully ignorant and accusing me of saying stupid shit based on your own misunderstanding, I just caught this patently absurd comment of yours:

For one thing, the thalamus (it's singular, you know...)

Excuse me? No, it's not. I use the plural thalami to accurately denote a paired gland. Barring occurrences of adhesio interthalamica, the thalamus is not singular - all healthy humans contain two thalami, Chet, so your correction on this point is really amusing.

Then,

(the thalamus) isn't believed to be the center of either instinct or emotion, so its absence is irrelevant. (paren. mine)

Technically, the thalamic nuclei show strong and reciprocal affiliations with the cerebral cortex, forming thalamo-cortico-thalamic circuits that are believed to be involved with consciousness, so I opine its absence is relevant, but feel free to state your counterpoint.

As for,

..anencephalic individuals do, in fact, possess some parts of the brain. Repeat - they are not wholly without brains.

Well golly gee willakers, thanks yous for dat dere insight, yuck-yuck! (cl spits into spitoon)

I mean, photons in the visible spectrum are literally being created by energized electrons in the atoms of a portion of the light bulb.

Correct. Such directly challenges the idea that the material filament produces light, or that the illuminated material filament is the light.

..and it's (sic) can't contain any unknowables, because I know all of the ideas represented in the sentence.

No out-of-scope quantifiers or unknowables? Wow, you must be smarter than our most eminent neuroscientists then, if you can make the claim that all of the things that souls supposedly do are done by the brain. Such assumes knowledge of all soulical aspects which I hope you would avoid the mistake of claiming.

The soul does not exist because it is not necessary for it to exist;

No allusion to conclusion in premise? How about this useless theological classic:

God exists because it is necessary for God to exist.

I suppose that one doesn't hint of the conclusion in the premise, either?

There's much I'd like to say about your subsequent claims, but by the time I got to this I threw in the towel:

I apologize for having argued against something you're not advancing, but honestly, your concept of the soul seems to make even less sense than the classical formulation.

Apology accepted, along with the concession that your argument all along was that I'm saying stupid shit and worthy of denigration because you didn't understand me. Hmph.

For one thing, it seems like a phrase such as "moral reasoning" becomes a lot less meaningful and pretty absurd if determinism is true. The phrase presupposes that an actual decision is being made. But if determinism is true, there are no decisions; stuff just happens.

Maybe if I try to illustrate the difference that will make it clearer.

Let's say that in the future androids are commonplace. Further, let's say that a man has an android which looks like his twin. He has programmed the android to act exactly as he does. The android, however, cannot be said to have sentience; it only has a sophisticated and deceptively human sort of hardwired response.

Now, imagine two scenarios. In scenario 1, the man goes shopping and happens to pass by an open cargo truck, and he sees an expensive watch or other item that he can steal. He decides to leave the item alone, and walks on his way. Was his action moral? Why or why not?

In scenario 2, the man sends the android shopping. The android passes by the cargo truck, and acts just as the man would per his programming and doesn't touch the item. Does this make the android moral? Why or why not?

In a literal sense, a lightbulb does not produce light.

But that's patently absurd. I'm looking at a lightbulb right now (ouch) and it's producing light. Quite a bit of it, actually. (Gonna stop looking now.) As I said, it's sort of the point of lightbulbs - the production of light.

I mean, photons in the visible spectrum are literally being created by energized electrons in the atoms of a portion of the light bulb. I don't know how you can get more "literally producing light" than that.

Is this what you want to spend your time arguing about?

Again, nothing in this statement is falsifiable, it contains at least two unknowables, it commits the every-and-all fallacy, and it's a close cousin to the circular argument.

Right, I heard you the first time. Did you miss the part where I rebutted these assertions? The conclusion is not being assumed in the premise, there's no scope issue that would cause an every-and-all fallacy, falsifiability criteria have been repeatedly given, and it's can't contain any unknowables, because I know all of the ideas represented in the sentence.

I don't see how you could possibly be more wrong. Repetition of your assertions does not seem to be making them any more correct.

That all soulical function resides in the brain?

...what?

Variance in the particular expressions of light (soul) can result either via damage to the filament (body), or via perturbations of electricity (spirit).

So brains produce souls, in your view?

Then where are they? Integral to the whole idea of the soul - indeed, the reason belief in souls persists - is the idea that the soul is the "man behind the curtain", a supernatural actor whose presence cannot be discerned by direct experience, but only by inference from the soul's influence on the material world. The soul is supposedly the puppetmaster pulling the strings from off-stage of the universe.

Your model seems to have it completely backwards. The way you talk we should be able to observe souls streaming out of the brains where they are produced.

We don't see that, I notice. I apologize for having argued against something you're not advancing, but honestly, your concept of the soul seems to make even less sense than the classical formulation. I mean it's beyond any need for me to respond to it; the idea of the soul/spirit you've put forth is fundamentally self-refuting.

Claims of instinct and emotion in an anencephalic infant without thalami directly challenge the argument from mind-brain unity. How do you respond to them?

They're not in any sense a direct challenge. For one thing, the thalamus (it's singular, you know, when you're only talking about one infant) isn't believed to be the center of either instinct or emotion, so its absence is irrelevant. Secondly anencephalic individuals do, in fact, possess some parts of the brain. Repeat - they are not wholly without brains.

Thirdly it's fairly common for humans to apprehend emotions where they don't exist. Anybody who thinks they're loved by their pets, for instance, is probably doing that. (Certainly anybody who thinks their computer is mad at them is doing that, as another example.) It's not exactly anthropomorphizing (since the "object" is actually a human) but it's close.

Furthermore, if this argument is true, explain the fact that one need not even perturb brain matter to evoke demonstrable and predictable changes in soulical expression, i.e. the well-documented tonsillectomy studies of the Italian brothers Calderelli showing that the emotions and personalities of tonsillectomy patients were noticeably and predictably affected?

Again I don't see the challenge. Obviously human beings respond to stimulation without needing to have their brains prodded. Can you explain the challenge, here? I don't see it.

How do you reply to Grinker's strong symposium against the absolute extendability of line-point mechanisms?

This, incidentally, is gibberish.

Such is an extremely pertinent question that nobody's taken a stab at.

No, it's an irrelevant red herring.

Chet, I don't understand you.
You try to excuse determinism as having little effect on life, and then tell me you think the world probably isn't deterministic anyway.

What's not to understand? It's two separate positions:

1) I don't consider the determinism question to be interesting, troubling, controversial, or significant; it has the same effect on my life as whether or not there's a teapot in orbit of Alpha Centauri. I think I've made the case for how moral reasoning isn't meaningfully impacted by the spectre of determinism.

2) But if you push me on it, like you did, my guess is that human behavior probably isn't deterministic, since the universe is nondeterministic at it's lowest level. But I don't think that's an ironclad proof of anything. It's just a guess.

I don't know, I don't see the contradiction. I don't see what's so hard to understand.

So I still don't know what a spirit does, or why it is necessary to posit it to understand anything about human functioning.

Remember when you told me forget my argument with Chet? Well forget any mention of spirit and soul. That's not my argument. My argument is that line-point mechanisms are not absolutely extensible. Surgical incisions and electrode stimulation merely alter circuitry and do not post hoc establish the origin of emotion in any spatial place. If we are the wiring, what sayest thou to Sedgwick and Neilsen's claims of instinct and emotion in an anencephalic infant without thalami?

Such is an extremely pertinent question that nobody's taken a stab at.

I don't understand what is meant by "transcendental entities." Saying the spirit is an "impetus" smacks of vitalism, which we know is false. There is no elan vital.

So I still don't know what a spirit does, or why it is necessary to posit it to understand anything about human functioning.

You've repeatedly avoided presenting a position that can be criticized.

I disagree. I've supplied working definitions to Mathew Wilder. Sorry if you missed them. Either way, the point is moot - initial discussion of souls vs. spirits arose when Chet said he could demonstrate that all behaviors souls are allegedly responsible for have their root causality in the brain. I initially sought to avoid getting drawn into a futile discussion over definitions of what may be unfalsifiable constructs, and seriously, why do I need to provide any definitions of soul or spirit if what I'm objecting and what I want to argue about is this so-called argument from mind-brain unity?

If you remove or damage the graphics card from a computer, that computer can no longer display video. If you remove or damage the anterior cingulate cortex of the brain (for example), the affected person loses the desire to speak or act, and will simply lie where they are - awake and alert, but with no reaction to stimuli and no volitional will.

Yes, I've conceded that much, and such proceeds logically from my argument as well as yours.

If you're willing to believe that certain functions of a computer can be produced by material causes, but certain functions of consciousness arbitrarily can't, then yours is nothing but an argument from incredulity.

First, the examples you give are not examples of functions being produced; they are examples of functions being reduced or eliminated. Second, I don't believe certain functions of a computer can be produced by material causes. I believe certain functions of a computer are affected by material causes, just as I believe certain soulical expressions are affected by material causes.

Ebon, how do you reply to Nielsen and Sedgwick's claims of instinct and emotion in an anencephalic infant without thalami? How would you respond to Spiegel, Wycis, et al. in their conclusion that "..it is not possible to refer emotional reactions to a single circumscribed nucleus within the diencephalon or to connections with the frontal lobes, but there exists a multiple representation of this function?" How do you reply to Grinker's strong symposium against the absolute extendability of line-point mechanisms? How does your argument from mind-brain unity square with the well-documented tonsillectomy studies of the Italian brothers Calderelli showing that the emotions and personalities of tonsillectomy patients were noticeably and predictably affected?

Brad,

Isn't a computer a tripartite system, then? Impetus = input; scaffolding = architecture; result = output. Mere input doesn't change into output by itself, and computer architecture without being called upon by instruction doesn't do anything. The brain, I think, could be described similarly.

Yes, I said a computer and a car were both reasonable examples, and I agree with the rest of your statement as worded.

..by your definition above, in order to keep a supernatural triparte description of human beings, one must show that brain function is "not possible" with nothing but physical causes. In other words, the soul must be a necessary entity.

I disagree. One must show that soulical expression is not possible without a spirit, and I think we can both agree such is currently a fool's endeavor.

Now - please answer any of these - how do you reply to Nielsen and Sedgwick's claims of instinct and emotion in an anencephalic infant without thalami? How would you respond to Spiegel, Wycis, et al. in their conclusion that "..it is not possible to refer emotional reactions to a single circumscribed nucleus within the diencephalon or to connections with the frontal lobes, but there exists a multiple representation of this function?" How do you reply to Grinker's strong symposium against the absolute extendability of line-point mechanisms? How does the argument from mind-brain unity square with the well-documented tonsillectomy studies of the Italian brothers Calderelli showing that the emotions and personalities of tonsillectomy patients were noticeably and predictably affected?

Nontheless, you completely reiterated that you believe that lightbulbs do not produce light - not as an analogy, but literally. If that's not what you meant to say then take another chance to express yourself more clearly, if you like.

In a literal sense, a lightbulb does not produce light. I'm not arguing such purely analogously. You understood me correctly back when you were calling me willfully ignorant and accusing me of saying stupid shit. Hopefully we're clear now.

The soul does not exist because it is not necessary for it to exist; all of the things that souls supposedly do happen in, and are done by, the brain.

Again, nothing in this statement is falsifiable, it contains at least two unknowables, it commits the every-and-all fallacy, and it's a close cousin to the circular argument. You did offer the soul-brain dichotomy as an example of something falsifiable, but your claim as stated is not falsifiable. What testable prediction does it make? That all soulical function resides in the brain? Even if I grant that your conclusion is not alluded to in your premises, which I do not, you still have other charges here.

As for your crane analogy,

..malfunction in the brain shouldn't change who you are. But that's exactly what we see. Back to the crane operator analogy - if you break off the lever on the control panel, the man inside can't make the hook move anymore. Sure, that makes sense. But what we're talking about now is the observed phenomenon that if you break off another lever, the man inside suddenly doesn't like chocolate anymore, or suddenly can only communicate in Spanish. It doesn't make any sense in a model where consciousness - "self" - is separate from the material brain. It makes perfect sense only in a model where "self" is the material brain.

I don't accept your free lunch. I disagree from the outset, and I'm sorry you can't see another viable interpretation, but that doesn't make me willfully ignorant or stupid. In my model, consciousness is not separate from the material brain; rather, consciousness is in every way connected to and dependent upon the normal functioning of the brain as light is in every way connected to and dependent upon a working filament. Variance in the particular expressions of light (soul) can result either via damage to the filament (body), or via perturbations of electricity (spirit). So malfunction to the brain should affect soulical expression in tripartism and your crane analogy as expounded here applies nil to my life, thank you.

What's to tackle? None of those things contradict a material origin of thought or necessitate a soul.

I disagree, Chet. Claims of instinct and emotion in an anencephalic infant without thalami directly challenge the argument from mind-brain unity. How do you respond to them?

Furthermore, if this argument is true, explain the fact that one need not even perturb brain matter to evoke demonstrable and predictable changes in soulical expression, i.e. the well-documented tonsillectomy studies of the Italian brothers Calderelli showing that the emotions and personalities of tonsillectomy patients were noticeably and predictably affected?

Mathew Wilder,

So then I misunderstood what you were trying to say.

You seem to have the basic concept IMO, and I appreciate that instead of assuming I'm willfully ignorant or stupid, you grant me the benefit of the doubt and inquire further. I really appreciate that.

That seems awfully convenient for you doesn't it?

No, not given the original scope of my comments...

So what I'm asking, I guess, isn't for a definition of "soul" and "spirit" but a description of what they do. Those two words are, for me, without any cognitive content. I don't know what they mean, what they refer to, and I have no idea what the words are supposed to be used to explain. What are you saying when you talk about "soul" and "spirit"?

At times I think of the spirit as the entity that transcends physical death, and the soul as the temporary product of spirit and body. Under tripartism, the soul is better described as a liquid-like state than a tangible or transcendental entity. As an impetus, electricity (spirit) needs scaffolding (body) through which it can flow to produce any singular instance along the spectrum of electromagnetic energy we call light (soul). Variance in the particular expressions of light (soul) can also result via damage to the scaffolding (body), or perturbances of electricity (spirit).

You try to excuse determinism as having little effect on life, and then tell me you think the world probably isn't deterministic anyway.

Why excuse something you don't believe in?